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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) appeals the 
District Court’s Order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees Timothy Shaw (“Shaw”), individually and d/b/a Shaw 
Brothers Donkey Ball Co., and Robert Eisenberry (“Eisenberry”).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will vacate the District Court’s Order and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
BACKGROUND 
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Shaw was the sole proprietor of a business that provided donkeys for charity 
basketball events.1
Shaw had a commercial general liability policy for the business with Nationwide 
(the “Insurance Policy”), providing coverage for claims of bodily injury or property 
damage, among other areas of coverage.  The Insurance Policy contained a number of 
exclusions to coverage.  The relevant exclusion provision at issue here stated: 
  The donkeys were housed and cared for in a New York barn that 
Shaw leased in the name of his business.  For several decades, the business operated 
under the name “Shaw Brothers Donkey Ball Company.”  Around 2003, on the advice of 
his attorney, Shaw changed the name of the business to “Shaw Brothers Donkey Ball, 
LLC.” 
2. Exclusions 
 This insurance does not apply to: 
 e. Employer’s Liability 
  “Bodily injury” to: 
 (1) An “employee” of the insured arising out of 
and in the course of: 
 
 (a) Employment by the insured; or 
  
 (b) Performing duties related to the conduct of 
the insured’s business 
 
(App. 160.)  In other words, Nationwide expressly removed from coverage a bodily 
injury to one of Shaw’s “employees.”   
                                              
1 Shaw’s family started the business, which Shaw assumed sole control of in 
approximately 2001.  Shaw earned money from admission fees charged to those 
attending the fundraising events.  He closed the business around August 2009. 
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 The Insurance Policy, however, did not define who constitutes an employee of the 
business.  Instead, the Insurance Policy merely stated that an  “employee” includes a 
“leased worker”  but does not include a “temporary worker.”  (App. 170.)  Those two 
terms are defined in the Insurance Policy: 
10. “Leased worker” means a person leased to you by a 
labor leasing firm under an agreement between you and the 
labor leasing firm, to perform duties related to the conduct of 
your business.  “Leased worker” does not include a 
“temporary worker.” 
 
19. “Temporary worker” means a person who is furnished 
to you to substitute for a permanent “employee” on leave or 
to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. 
 
(App. 170, 172.)  Separately, the Insurance Policy defined a “volunteer worker” as a 
“person who is not your ‘employee,’ and who donates his or her work and acts at the 
discretion of and within the scope of duties determined by you, and is not paid a fee, 
salary or other compensation by you or anyone else for their work performed for you.”  
(App. 172.) 
Eisenberry was a retired farmer who had known Shaw for approximately ten to 
twelve years at the time of the accident that precipitated this litigation, though the two 
were not “close family friend[s].”  (App. 17.)  Eisenberry was introduced to Shaw 
through Mr. Parks, who baled hay for Shaw.  Mr. Parks informed Shaw that Eisenberry 
could help him (Shaw) whenever needed.  At some point thereafter, Eisenberry began 
working at the New York barn that housed Shaw’s donkeys.  Eisenberry’s responsibilities 
included unloading and moving hay, cleaning the donkey stalls, and feeding and watering 
the donkeys.   
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On September 4, 2007, Eisenberry was in possession of Shaw’s truck.  At some 
point, Eisenberry arrived at the farm and began helping Shaw and another man unload 
bales of hay from a wagon.  Eisenberry was stacking bales of hay on the second floor of 
the barn when he fell through the floor due to missing planks that were covered by pieces 
of hay.  Eisenberry was rendered a paraplegic as a result of the fall.   
Eisenberry sued Shaw in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, asserting premises liability.  On February 9, 2010, a jury returned a verdict 
in Eisenberry’s favor.2
II. 
  On February 19, 2010, Nationwide filed a declaratory judgment 
action in the District Court against Shaw, the Donkey Ball business, and Eisenberry.  
Nationwide asserted that it was not liable under the Insurance Policy to provide coverage 
to Shaw for the accident.  Both sides moved for summary judgment.  On August 22, 
2011, the District Court denied Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment and granted 
summary judgment in favor of Shaw, the Donkey Ball business, and Eisenberry.  
Nationwide filed a timely appeal.  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the District Court’s jurisdiction was premised on diversity, we, like the 
District Court, “must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”  Liggon-
Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  We 
                                              
2 At oral argument, counsel for Nationwide informed this Court that Eisenberry 
and Nationwide stipulated to an award of $1 million in damages. 
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exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Doe v. 
Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).   
III. ANALYSIS3
The central issue in the declaratory judgment action is whether Eisenberry was 
Shaw’s “employee” at the time of the accident, as that term is contemplated in the 
Insurance Policy.  If Eisenberry assumed employee status, the employee exclusion 
provision in the Insurance Policy would apply, and Shaw would be unable to seek 
coverage for the accident.  On the other hand, if Eisenberry was not Shaw’s employee, 
then Nationwide concedes it must provide Shaw with coverage for the accident. 
 
A. Insurance Policy’s Definition of “Employee” 
We begin with the terms of the Insurance Policy itself.  The parties acknowledge, 
and the District Court agreed, that the Insurance Policy fails to provide a complete and 
sufficient definition of “employee.”  We agree. 
The Insurance Policy states that an employee includes a leased worker but does 
not include a temporary worker.  Eisenberry was neither.  To be a leased worker, 
Eisenberry would have had to be furnished to Shaw under a labor leasing agreement.  To 
be a temporary worker, Eisenberry would have had to be replacing a permanent employee 
or meeting Shaw’s short-term needs.  Neither situation is factually true here.   
Separately, the Insurance Policy provides that an individual who donates his time 
and is not paid a fee or other compensation—what the Insurance Policy classifies as a 
                                              
3 Nationwide raised several points of error in its briefing.  At oral argument, 
counsel for Nationwide conceded each issue, except the District Court’s application of 
the employee liability exclusion provision.  Accordingly, we will address only this issue. 
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“volunteer worker”—is not an employee.  The record reveals that Eisenberry was paid for 
his services in a variety of forms, even though this compensation was not calculated 
based on time worked.  First, Shaw permitted Eisenberry to take hay from the barn to 
feed his (Eisenberry’s) animals.  Eisenberry stated that this amounted to approximately 
ten to fifteen bales of hay per month, at roughly eighty cents per bale.  Second, 
Eisenberry was permitted to use Shaw’s truck.  Third, on occasion, Shaw gave Eisenberry 
about $5 or $10 for gas money.  While this multifaceted form of payment was surely 
modest, it still constitutes sufficient compensation to remove Eisenberry from volunteer 
worker status. 
Because the Insurance Policy does not resolve whether Eisenberry was Shaw’s 
employee, the parties agreed in the District Court to have the term “employee,” as used in 
the Insurance Policy, be synonymous with the definition of the term provided in 
Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”).  We turn now to the WCA.4
B. Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
 
The WCA defines an “employe”5
                                              
4 We note that our analysis under the WCA is not intended to be the archetype for 
adjudicating whether an employer-employee relationship existed.  Our ruling should not 
supplant a necessary inquiry into Pennsylvania common law.  We consult the WCA 
because the parties expressly agreed that the term “employee,” as used in the Insurance 
Policy, would be elucidated by the definition of that term in the WCA.  Nevertheless, we 
adhere to the position that the determination of employee status is determined by 
Pennsylvania common law. 
 as “[a]ll natural persons who perform services 
for another for a valuable consideration, exclusive of persons whose employment is 
casual in character and not in the regular course of the business of the employer . . . .”  77 
5 This is the spelling of the term in the statutory text. 
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Pa. Cons. Stat. § 22.  Brookhaven Baptist Church v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 
(Halvorson), 912 A.2d 770 (Pa. 2006) is the most recent case in this area.  In 
Brookhaven, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania iterated that there are three elements to 
this definition:  “(1) the presence of valuable consideration; (2) whether the employment 
was casual in character; and (3) whether the employment was in the regular course of 
employer’s business.”6
Before we proceed to analyze these three elements, we address the interplay 
between them.  As to the first element, the WCA provides that an employee is one who 
receives valuable consideration for his services.  Absent the exchange of valuable 
consideration, Eisenberry could not be Shaw’s employee.  The inquiry would end at this 
step. 
  Id. at 776.   
As the District Court noted, the statutory language regarding the second and third 
elements has engendered some debate in Pennsylvania courts.  While the second and 
third elements are joined by the connector “and” in the statutory text, suggesting by its 
plain terms that the presence of both elements is necessary to find that an individual is not 
an employee under the WCA, the Brookhaven court found “a certain degree of 
ambiguity” in the statute.  Id. at 778.  The Brookhaven court noted that it has, in prior 
cases, found the second and third elements to be both conjunctive and disjunctive.  Id.  
That is, the statute has been interpreted to exempt from coverage “a person . . . both 
casually employed and not engaged in the business of the employer” as well as a person 
                                              
6 As in Brookhaven, the parties here do not dispute that Eisenberry was a “natural 
person” under the WCA. 
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who satisfies either of these two criteria.  Id.  The Brookhaven court cited cases 
purportedly supporting both interpretations of the statute, though the Brookhaven court 
did not seek to resolve the ambiguity.  Id. 
This ambiguity is at the forefront of this case.  Faced with an unresolved issue of 
state law, the District Court applied the disjunctive approach.  The District Court 
reasoned, without providing any support for its preference, that it “was persuaded by the 
reasoning of those decision [sic] that conclude a worker is exempt from coverage—and in 
that sense not an employee—if that worker is either employed casually or not engaged in 
the business of the employer.”  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shaw, No. 3:10-cv-374, 2011 
WL 3667565, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2011).   
Nationwide asserts that the District Court erred in choosing to apply a disjunctive 
standard.  Specifically, Nationwide argues that, contrary to the declaration of ambiguity 
by Pennsylvania’s highest court, we should part ways with the state supreme court and 
conclude that the WCA plainly imposes a conjunctive standard through the use of the 
connector “and” in the statutory text.  As for the cases cited by the Brookhaven court 
purportedly advocating the disjunctive approach, Nationwide avers that those cases are 
actually consistent with the conjunctive approach.  On the other hand, Shaw and 
Eisenberry contend that the District Court correctly determined that Pennsylvania law is 
ambiguous on this issue and, as a result, the District Court was justified in applying the 
disjunctive approach.   
We agree with Nationwide that the District Court erred by not applying a 
conjunctive standard, but we cannot disregard Brookhaven as Nationwide suggests.  
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Because jurisdiction in this case was founded on diversity, we must follow any applicable 
authoritative rulings from the state supreme court.  See Mitchell Partners, L.P. v. Irex 
Corp., 656 F.3d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that a “federal court must apply the law 
declared by the supreme court of the relevant state”).  The Brookhaven court determined 
that the WCA was ambiguous to some degree, and we are not permitted to ignore this 
determination. 
Although the Brookhaven court found there to be an ambiguity as to whether a 
conjunctive or disjunctive standard was warranted, the court declined to resolve the 
dispute.  Where an issue has not been addressed by the state’s highest court, “we must 
predict how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue.”  Wayne Moving & Storage 
of N.J., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 625 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  The Brookhaven court’s decision not to resolve the 
ambiguity present in the definition of “employee” requires this Court to predict how the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would resolve it. 
Upon reviewing Pennsylvania precedent and the text of the WCA, we conclude 
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would find that the statutory text “exclusive of 
persons whose employment is casual in character and not in the regular course of the 
business of the employer” imposes a conjunctive standard.  77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 22.  The 
WCA links two elements—whether the employment was casual and whether the work 
performed was part and parcel of the business—with the connector “and.”  Based on 
general principles of statutory interpretation, the connector “and” in a statute signifies a 
conjunctive standard.  See Rivera v. Phila. Theological Seminary of St. Charles 
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Borromeo, Inc., 507 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. 1986).7
But a closer inspection of these cases reveals that they are not inconsistent with a 
conjunctive approach.  In Cochrane v. William Penn Hotel, the court agreed with a lower 
court that a maintenance worker at a hotel, who died while on the job, was an employee 
under the WCA.  16 A.2d 43, 44 (Pa. 1940).  The court found that because the 
maintenance worker was not employed casually, it did not need to consider the propriety 
of the lower court’s additional finding that the worker was not engaged in the business of 
the hotel.  Id.  Applying a conjunctive standard, the employee would need to be both 
employed casually and not working in the regular course of his employer’s business to be 
exempt from the definition of employee.  That the state supreme court ruled that the 
worker was not employed casually was sufficient by itself to support a finding that the 
decedent was an employee.  Id. 
  The Brookhaven court cited two state 
supreme court cases purportedly following a different canon of statutory interpretation, 
treating the connector “and” as an “or,” and requiring only one of these two elements for 
the employee exemption to apply.   
The other case cited by the Brookhaven court—Marsh v. Groner, 102 A. 127 (Pa. 
1917)—is admittedly less clear on this point.  In Marsh, a handyman was injured while 
remodeling a woman’s home; he argued that the woman owed him workers’ 
compensation for his injury.  Id. at 128.  The court focused its inquiry on whether the 
handyman was engaged in the woman’s business, reasoning that the woman’s decision to 
                                              
7 Analyzing federal law, we have similarly determined that the word “and” 
imposes a conjunctive standard.  See Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 
235-36 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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remodel her home did not rise to the level of a business for which the handyman could be 
engaged.  Id. at 128-29.  As a result, the court affirmed a lower court ruling that denied 
the handyman workers’ compensation.  Id. at 129.   
The approach taken in Marsh is somewhat muddled.  On the one hand, the court 
concluded that the handyman’s work was not within the regular course of any business 
and, therefore, affirmed a finding that the statutory exemption applied.  This logic 
appears to countenance a disjunctive approach, as the court did not expressly conclude 
that it also must find the handyman’s work to be casual to apply the exemption.  
However, the court also noted in its concluding sentences that the handyman’s 
employment “was casual in character.”  Id.  When read in tandem with the court’s finding 
that the employment was not in the regular course of business, this would imply that a 
conjunctive approach was considered. 
We cannot discern which approach curried the favor of the Marsh court, but we 
need not resolve that issue in this case.  Even assuming the Marsh court applied a 
disjunctive standard, countless decisions since Marsh have unequivocally stated that the 
WCA imposes a conjunctive standard.  See, e.g., McCabe v. Timothy Shanahan & Son, 
24 A.2d 16, 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (“In order that the employer be relieved from 
liability both elements must be established, i.e., the employment must be (1) casual and 
(2) not in the regular course of the business of the employer.”); Diviney v. J. H. France 
Fire Brick Co., 13 A.2d 109, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) (“It is clear from the plain 
language of this provision, that in order to exclude an employe[e] under this exception, it 
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must appear that his employment was not only occasional and incidental, but also outside 
of the regular course of the business of the employer.”).8
Accordingly, we conclude the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, were it faced with 
this issue, would determine that the WCA imposes a conjunctive standard.  As a result, 
under the WCA, an individual who receives valuable consideration is exempt from 
employee status only if that individual was both employed casually and not performing 
work in the regular course of the employer’s business.  It was error for the District Court 
to apply a disjunctive standard to the statutory language “exclusive of persons whose 
employment is casual in character and not in the regular course of the business of the 
employer.”  77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 22.  Having discussed the interplay between the three 
elements present in the WCA’s definition of employee, we now proceed to address the 
District Court’s findings regarding each of these elements.  Because we will remand for 
fact finding on each element, we direct the District Court to apply a conjunctive approach 
to subsequent WCA analysis regarding the second and third elements. 
   
1. Element 1: Valuable Consideration 
An individual can be considered an employee, pursuant to the WCA, only if he 
received valuable consideration.  Eisenberry was responsible for caring and maintaining 
the donkeys used in Shaw’s business, for which he received some compensation.  The 
issue is whether that compensation constituted valuable consideration.       
                                              
8 It also is noteworthy that Marsh predates each case cited by the Brookhaven 
court in support of the conjunctive interpretation, including Cochrane, which, as we have 
determined, is entirely consistent with a conjunctive reading. 
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Under Pennsylvania law, there is a presumption that “if services are performed for 
the payor directly, . . . the amount received is for the service and it is not a gift or 
honorarium.”  Brookhaven, 912 A.2d at 776.  An honorarium, by contrast, “is given to 
one who performed services for little or nothing and its tender is decided by the one for 
whom the services were performed without an obligation to give it.”  Id.  The District 
Court did not address the valuable consideration prong specifically, but the District Court 
did make factual findings germane to determining whether valuable consideration was 
exchanged.   
In concluding that Eisenberry was not a “volunteer worker” under the Insurance 
Policy, the District Court reasoned that “[a]ll parties agree that Eisenberry received hay 
and cash in exchange for feeding donkeys and cleaning the barn.  He therefore received a 
salary or other compensation for his services . . . .”  Shaw, 2011 WL 3667565, at *8.  
This determination would appear to support a finding that Eisenberry received valuable 
consideration for his services.  Elsewhere in its opinion, however, the District Court 
referred to Eisenberry’s compensation as “occasional” and “supplemental and incidental 
to his larger purpose for [sic] spending his time on Shaw’s farm.”  Id. at *10.  This 
finding paints a somewhat different picture of the compensation, more akin to an 
honorarium.  The compensation itself amounted to the equivalent of, at most, $144 per 
year in hay (fifteen bales per month at eighty cents per bale), $5 or $10 in gas money on 
occasion, and the use of Shaw’s truck. 
Given the inherent tension between the District Court’s assessments of 
Eisenberry’s compensation and the omission of any analysis on the valuable 
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consideration element, we cannot ascertain, on this record, whether Eisenberry received 
valuable consideration for his services.  We will remand to the District Court to resolve 
this genuine dispute of material fact. 
2.   Element 2: Casual Employment 
The second element of the WCA asks whether the employment was casual.  
“[E]mployment is casual in character where it is occasional, irregular, or incidental as 
distinguished from regular and continuous.”  Brookhaven, 912 A.2d at 293 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  In other words, work is casual where it “comes 
about by chance, fortuitously, and for no fixed duration of time.”  Id. (quoting Blake v. 
Wilson, 112 A. 126, 129 (Pa. 1920)).  The District Court found that Eisenberry was 
employed casually based on several factual findings: (1) Eisenberry’s employment was 
occasional, without a set schedule; (2) Eisenberry’s work served the limited purpose of 
caring for the donkeys; and (3) Eisenberry’s compensation was not fixed.  Of these 
factual findings, only the first is relevant in determining whether Eisenberry worked with 
regularity.  That Eisenberry’s tasks were limited and his compensation imprecise has no 
bearing on the frequency with which he worked.   
As to the regularity of his employment, we conclude that a genuine dispute of 
material fact exists that precludes a finding that Eisenberry worked occasionally.  In 
support of this determination, we look to the “sham affidavit” doctrine.  This doctrine 
states that “a party may not create a material issue of fact to defeat summary judgment by 
filing an affidavit disputing his or her own sworn testimony without demonstrating a 
plausible explanation for the conflict.”  Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624 (3d Cir. 2004) 
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(citation omitted).  “[I]f it is clear that an affidavit is offered solely for the purpose of 
defeating summary judgment, it is proper for the trial judge to conclude that no 
reasonable jury could accord that affidavit evidentiary weight and that summary 
judgment is appropriate.”  Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 
2007).  As a remedy, a district court is permitted to disregard the affidavit,  id., unless 
there is independent evidence to bolster the contradictory testimony, id. at 254.   
In the underlying tort action that Eisenberry brought against Shaw for damages, 
Shaw was questioned about the regularity of Eisenberry’s work: 
Q: Can you tell me how much time that year he would 
have fed and watered the donkeys? 
 
A: 10 to 12 times. 
 
. . . .  
 
Q: Would he – I understand from some testimony they 
[sic] has given that he would have worked Saturdays 
and Sundays in feeding and watering the donkeys.  
Does that sound correct to you? 
 
A: No. 
 
Q:  No?  Okay. 
 
A: Sundays is a normal day to clean the barn.  You know, 
so it’s possible he could be there a couple of Sundays a 
year, but . . . . 
 
Q: Okay.  So your recollection is that he was only there 
on a few Sundays, a couple of Sundays a year? 
 
A: It’s possible that he could have been there, yes. 
 
(App. 18.)   
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 In that same action, Eisenberry was asked a similar line of questioning: 
Q: And would you work for Tim three days per week? 
 
A: Usually two days a week doing the barn, that’s 
Saturday and Sunday and the rest of the time he’d call 
me up if he needed me for anything. 
 
Q: So what was your primary job with Tim, what was it 
that you did mostly? 
 
A: Clean the barn. 
Q: And that was usually on a Saturday and Sunday? 
 
A: Yup. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q: You heard him, Tim, testify that you were there, 
approximately, maybe, 10, 12 times a year? 
 
A: I was there a lot more than that.  I was there every 
Sunday. 
 
Q: Just helping out at the barn? 
 
A: Yeah, cleaning the barn.  
(App. 250, 257.)  Not only did Eisenberry establish in the prior litigation that he worked 
for Shaw at least two days a week, in addition to any days that Shaw requested, but 
Eisenberry directly refuted Shaw’s recollection that he (Eisenberry) worked only a 
handful of times during the year. 
Now, in the present case, just five days before Shaw and Eisenberry filed a motion 
for summary judgment, Eisenberry signed an affidavit that was attached to the motion.  In 
that affidavit, Eisenberry contradicted his prior testimony in the underlying case and 
sought to align his testimony with Shaw’s.  As to the frequency with which he worked, 
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Eisenberry stated, “Tim would call me when he needed help usually ten (10) to twelve 
(12) times per year.”  (App. 91.)  Eisenberry made no mention of having worked at least 
every Saturday and Sunday, as he previously had testified in the underlying case.9
Although Shaw testified in the prior action that Eisenberry worked on an irregular 
and infrequent basis, Eisenberry flatly disagreed.  Perhaps recognizing that his testimony 
would possibly put him within the purview of the employee liability exclusion, 
Eisenberry reversed course, just days before moving for summary judgment, and sought 
to harmonize his testimony with Shaw’s. 
 
At oral argument, counsel for Shaw and Eisenberry was presented with, and asked 
to explain, Eisenberry’s conflicting testimony.  Despite his efforts, counsel was unable to 
find congruency between the two sets of statements.  Counsel instructed this Court to 
breathe new meaning into Eisenberry’s prior testimony that he worked at least two days 
per week on Shaw’s farm.  As counsel stated, Eisenberry’s farming background and 
limited education meant that he viewed the term “work” as synonymous with simply 
visiting the animals and performing no work at all.  We reject counsel’s interpretation.  
Not only does this interpretation—that working at least two days a week cleaning a barn 
is a rural euphemism for spending quality time with animals—defy common sense, 
counsel could identify no independent evidence in the record to bolster this alternative 
interpretation. 
                                              
9 One need not look far to perceive the objective of the affidavit.  Eisenberry holds 
a judgment based on the underlying action against Shaw.  Eisenberry seeks enforcement 
of the judgment.  Given the employee liability exclusion provision, both Shaw and 
Eisenberry would be well served if they testified that Eisenberry was a casual worker. 
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The District Court determined that there was no inconsistency between 
Eisenberry’s testimony and his affidavit regarding the frequency with which he worked.  
But the District Court provided no justification for its determination, merely stating, 
without support, that “Eisenberry’s description of his frequent presence at the barn and 
frequent assistance to Shaw does not contradict Eisenberry’s sworn testimony.”  Shaw, 
2011 WL 3667565, at *7 n.3.  We cannot discern how the District Court reached this 
conclusion.  To the contrary, as counsel for Shaw and Eisenberry eventually conceded at 
oral argument, the common sense understanding of Eisenberry’s prior testimony is in 
direct conflict with the statement in his affidavit. 
As a result, it was error for the District Court not to disregard Eisenberry’s sham 
affidavit.  There remains a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the frequency with 
which Eisenberry worked.  The District Court’s determination that Eisenberry was 
casually employed is unsupported on this record.  Id. at *9-11.  Shaw testified that 
Eisenberry worked ten to twelve times total during the year the accident occurred.  
Eisenberry, on the other hand, testified that he worked every Saturday and Sunday and 
any other time that he was needed.  Remand is necessary to ascertain whether Eisenberry 
was casually employed, pursuant to the second element of the WCA framework. 
3. Element 3: Engaged in Shaw’s Business 
The third factor we must look to under the WCA framework is whether Eisenberry 
performed work in the regular course of Shaw’s business. 
While the District Court did not directly address whether Eisenberry was engaged 
in Shaw’s business for purposes of the WCA, elsewhere in its opinion the District Court 
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found that Eisenberry’s task of “caring for and feeding donkeys is action arising out of 
the business.”  Shaw, 2011 WL 3667565, at *4.  The parties do not challenge this 
determination.  Based on this isolated statement and an application of the conjunctive 
approach, Nationwide asserts that one of the two statutory criteria for exemption is 
lacking, requiring that we simply reverse the District Court and award summary 
judgment in its favor. 
Given the numerous factual disputes in the record and the District Court’s 
omission of any analysis on this element, we find it prudent not to hypothesize whether 
the District Court would have found that Eisenberry was engaged in Shaw’s business.  As 
with the other statutory elements, we will remand for factfinding on this third element. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s Order and remand 
for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
